What Harms Does Taqlid Have
Throughout this collection, it has been shown that from the perspective of the Qur'an, hadiths, and reason, taqlid is forbidden and has been prohibited. Some aspects of taqlid, such as choosing the most learned (a'lam), are altogether impossible. In this section, we examine why God has forbidden taqlid. What is wrong with someone who does not know something asking a specialist and implementing whatever answer they give without asking for proof? What reason has made this method — which is accepted in medicine, architecture, car repair, etc. — so evil, sinful, and polytheistic in religion? In what follows, numerous harms of taqlid are enumerated, which may themselves be the reasons for its prohibition.
Bloated and Grounded Jurisprudence
The impossibility of determining a single ruling for all situations of a given issue is a problem forgotten in taqlid. Every issue has a complex context[1] and conditions from which an appropriate ruling can be derived, and only the individual himself knows that context precisely. If a religious scholar wanted to give a ruling for all these situations, he would have to consider thousands of "ifs" and "buts," producing a thick book that would still be incomplete. Even then, the muqallid would face difficulty and error in applying the fatwa to his own situation, causing the religion to appear unnecessarily bulky and complicated. Inevitably, maraji' separate the fatwa from the actual situation and issue a general ruling. For example, a ruling might differ depending on the situation or specific individuals, but the marja', to observe public interests, is compelled to cover all situations with a single ruling.
In contrast, if every person learned the foundations of their religion and, through daily acts of worship, practised searching for and referring to the Qur'an, hadiths, and scholars and examining their proofs, then when faced with any issue, they would follow the same path: refer to sources and scholars, listen to hadiths and verses and what concerns religion, understand the context better than anyone, consult with other parties involved in the issue, and ultimately adopt and act upon a decision that is most defensible on the Day of Resurrection. From then on, they would not abandon it to hope but would continue monitoring so that if they found a better path, they could correct and compensate for their previous action. There is also no need for maraji' to imagine and conceive in their minds all the situations that might arise for every individual and determine their duty.
Closing of the Gate of Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil
If we accept that our intellect does not have sufficient ability and time to understand religion, then the gate of advice, enjoining good, and forbidding evil from us toward the scholars would be closed, and toward others it would be very narrow and limited. Scholars would not consider us at a level where we could enjoin or forbid them or give them reminders, whereas every human being — including scholars — needs this, and without it, scientific and moral decline begins. Even the Prophet (p) and the Imams (a) sought criticism and consultation (in non-revealed matters) from people, and people had the right to disagree with them. Is such a thing imaginable regarding today's scholars?
The same applies to enjoining good and forbidding evil among other people. Someone who has no knowledge of the reasons and whys of rulings — if we ask them why something is good or bad, they have nothing to say except "because my marja' said so" — would be very limited in performing this duty. That is, if they can even recognise good and evil at all, since some people wait for their marja's fatwa to tell them whether a certain social phenomenon is good or evil before they can do anything about it. In the environment created by today's social media, one cannot merely speak of the virtues and dignities of maraji' taqlid and invite young people to religion without proof, argument, and knowledge of the whys of rulings.
Furthermore, if our marja' has given the correct ruling on an issue and another marja' has given a wrong one, we cannot enjoin good and forbid evil to the followers of that other marja' and tell them to stop, because they too have become convinced of their own marja's being the most learned through the testimony of several trusted individuals, and they do not consider themselves responsible beyond that. However, if there were no taqlid and scholars merely explained the proofs, and people themselves chose among the various proofs presented, then anyone could remind anyone else that they might have made a mistake, opening the gate of debate and dialogue in the body of society.
Monopoly of Religious Propagation by Scholars
Taqlid causes the work of propagating religion to be limited to a small group of scholars. However, if every person learned the rulings of their religion, they could transmit what they have learned to others with evidence and documentation. The hadiths of the Infallibles (a) have emphasised the importance of spreading knowledge, but when the majority of society are muqallids, they lack the ability to propagate, severely reducing the scope of acting upon these hadiths. An example of such hadiths:
A man came to the Messenger of Allah (p) and said, "O Messenger of Allah, what is knowledge?" He said, "Silence." He said, "Then what?" He said, "Listening." He said, "Then what?" He said, "Memorising." He said, "Then what?" He said, "Acting upon it." He said, "Then what, O Messenger of Allah?" He said, "Spreading it." (Usul al-Kafi, vol. 1, p. 48, view)
Decline in Scholars' Gatherings
One of the harms of taqlid is that people's engagement is reduced to acting upon a treatise, and their connection with scholars is limited to buying the treatise and occasional inquiries for rulings — and only from one marja' whom they imagine to be the most learned. In a word, the gatherings of scholars become less frequented. However, if people sought the proofs of rulings, they would need to attend scholars' gatherings more than ever, refer to more than one scholar, evaluate their opinions, inquire about the reasons for differences, etc. — all of which would make scholars' gatherings more vibrant. Numerous hadiths have been narrated about the importance of attending scholars' gatherings, including:
The Messenger of Allah (p) said: "The disciples said to Jesus (a), 'O Spirit of Allah, whom should we sit with?' He said, 'One whose appearance reminds you of Allah, whose speech increases your knowledge, and whose actions make you desirous of the hereafter.'" (Usul al-Kafi, vol. 1, p. 39, view)
The Marja's Behaviour Also Becomes Authoritative
If we accept that we lack the ability to understand religion and someone else has it, then in all likelihood, not only their juristic opinion but also their every behaviour becomes a model and even a religious proof for us — whereas the only proofs are the Qur'an, the Messenger (p), and the Imams (a). Defenders of taqlid themselves emphasise that the marja' is not infallible and his behaviour cannot be a proof, because if it were, there would be no difference between the Infallibles (a) and scholars. Nevertheless, we see that the slightest behaviour and even habits of scholars — who were supposed to research religion — become religious proof for some people. They do not even distinguish between the scholar's extracted ruling and his casual statements from a pulpit; all are considered God's ruling.
If some say they are aware and do not fall into this error, social reality shows otherwise. The sanctity and divineness that has formed around scholars among the people exists despite our being prohibited from it. The people of the Prophet's time would ask him, "Is what you say revelation or your personal opinion?" And if he said it was his opinion, they might disagree with him, and he would accept. Does such a distinction exist today between the words of scholars and their fatwas?
Shahid Murtada Mutahhari has written:
"As long as Muslims' relationship with the mullahs is one of kissing hands and feet, handing over money, and standing with hands on chests, the work of being Muslim will not be set right[2].... In our Shia community, for various causes and reasons, a mentality has developed that people are afraid of two things and do not want to approach them or open them: one is reason, and the other is the Qur'an. The Shia clergy is currently in a state where they are afraid of these two. That is why they are generally opposed to rational discourse in the broad sense — i.e., discussion and investigation[3] — and for the same reason, they are opposed to reflection upon the Qur'an, and schools of thought have emerged regarding the prohibition of referring to the Qur'an and the non-authoritativeness of the apparent meanings of the Qur'an[4]."
A little reflection leads us to realise that the root of hand-kissing and foot-kissing among Muslims is this very culture of taqlid. When a person has placed the responsibility for his worldly and otherworldly affairs on the marja' and sees him as his defender on the Day of Resurrection, kissing hands and feet before this (imaginary) service is natural. Remove taqlid from them and give them reason-based following, and the scope of such behaviours will become severely limited. Likewise, attention to reason and the Qur'an: if every person accepts that they must defend their actions in the hereafter to the extent of their own reason, their eyes will fall to the ground — unlike the state of taqlid, where the muqallid has delegated reckoning and the religious scholar sees that people accept whatever he says, so he no longer turns to reason and the Qur'an, loses familiarity with them, and after centuries of acting according to this tradition, approaching reason and the Qur'an becomes terrifying.
Danger of Misguidance
The truth is that "research" in its ideal sense — completing all prerequisites and fully understanding Islam to extract God's ruling and then present it to others — is practically unattainable. Even the greatest Islamic scholars cannot claim to have researched all aspects of religion, from worship, politics, economics, and society to modern technologies such as cryptocurrencies, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, etc., and to be fully knowledgeable about all their rulings. Therefore, complete trust in the opinion of any one of them while depriving oneself of the views of others is wrong and increases the probability of misguidance. No one possesses all the truth, and thinking such of anyone is to take them as God.
Various Readings Becoming Official
One of the harms of taqlid is that each marja' imposes his understanding as the correct Islam upon society. The greater the social status that marja' attains, the more official his understanding of Islam becomes. The result is that all people see Islam through the eyes of those maraji'. As is already the case: if we argue with evidence that a certain ruling is not part of Islam, they will say, "All maraji' or the majority of maraji' have understood this from Islam — how can you say this is not Islam?"
Or even if some accept that the ruling is not part of Islam, they say, "This Islam has a problem if it could not communicate its message to a few people in 1400 years, and all these scholars throughout all these centuries have understood it wrong." Although these arguments may appear superficially sound, the reality is that the problem lies in taqlid. If scholars merely shared their proofs with the people without issuing rulings, and left the decision about which proofs are correct and which should be chosen and acted upon to the people, no one could blame Islam and God for an incorrect ruling and say, "Islam is what that marja' presented." Every individual would be responsible themselves, and if they made a mistake, it would be said that they made a wrong decision.
Neglect of Essential Issues
When jurisprudence becomes the profession of a specific group, the likelihood increases that those engaged in this profession become excessively involved in a minor issue, neglecting the issues needed by society by spending their time on less important matters. As has been heard, a professor conducted a six-month course on the rules of ablution (wudu'), or said that if he were to explain all the issues of wudu', it would take six months.
In contrast, if people engage in tafaqquh, they pursue it only to the extent necessary. Since they must also attend to their other life affairs, they are forced to prioritise issues and spend more time and inquiry on more important matters. And when they ask scholars for the proofs of their rulings, the scholars are compelled to go deeper into issues that are more pursued and scrutinised by the people, directing their research and efforts according to society's needs.
Conservatism of Scholars
When the relationship between religious scholars and the people is based on something other than proof and argument, the scholar must present goods other than proof to the people, and he may even hide or not disclose some proofs and truths he has discovered. As explained in the section "Choosing the Most Learned is Impossible," no practical way to determine the most learned marja' has been offered except the testimony of a number of knowledgeable persons. Naturally, the next unwritten criterion becomes "a large number of followers." Additionally, as expressed in "There Is No Non-Blind Taqlid," another unwritten condition for determining a marja' is that he must not declare what God has made halal as haram or vice versa. Both these conditions restrict the marja's hand in speaking the truth, compelling him to withhold some truths or speak ambiguously in order to maintain people and preserve his status among them.
However, if taqlid were not in place, the religious scholar would freely share with society any truth he discovered, with proof and argument, without being concerned about how people would judge him. And it would be up to the people to choose whether the presented proofs were acceptable and whether they could defend themselves with those proofs on the Day of Resurrection.
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