Irresponsibility of the Social Body

The most important problem with taqlid is that its basis is the transfer of responsibility from the people to the marja' — something the Qur'an has called false (see the section "Verses Denying the Transfer of Responsibility" — currently only available in Persian). It is impossible for such a massive and unjust transfer to occur without worldly and otherworldly consequences. It seems that even if all other problems could somehow be resolved, this one is unsolvable and completely transforms the nature of taqlid. It is no longer "referring to an expert" but "removing and transferring responsibility." This makes people indifferent to the rulings they implement every day in society, because they think they have no say in whether their actions are good or bad and that someone else will answer for them. In family matters, buying and selling, daily interactions, and social dealings — in short, in every area where the religious scholar gives an opinion and people implement the fatwa without thinking or evaluating its correctness — this irresponsibility prevails.

Generally speaking, a person who removes the burden of responsibility from his own shoulders regarding the most important issues of his life — which determine his ultimate fate in the hereafter — and delegates it to another, and experiences and practises this day and night, is unconsciously raised and trained in this manner. Lack of responsibility, blaming others, and "I was ordered and excused" become a culture. In the office, the employee says, "It's none of my business, the boss said so!" In the family, "Father told me to do this, I don't know anything!" In business, "I don't understand the market, so-and-so told me to buy this stock!" — and thousands of similar examples. In contrast, the absence of taqlid causes the individual to remember his responsibility every day and with every choice, practising responsibility daily and becoming accustomed to always seeing and evaluating his role in events.

Beyond the micro level, at the macro level, marja'iyya becomes an office and position that comments on general and specific policies and changes people's destinies without providing proof for its opinion and without accepting any responsibility for the final outcome — whereas in God's religion, such a position has never been confirmed or endorsed. Politicians coordinate their decisions with the households of certain maraji' instead of taking them from their constituents — the people — without even obtaining the opinions of all maraji' or counting how many people consider them the most learned. That is, two maraji' may have different opinions, and the majority of people may not consider one of them as the most learned (or may even consider him unjust), but such calculations are not made at this level; a single opinion from a marja' is sufficient for a particular policy to be implemented or halted. In this atmosphere, if we ask any macro or micro figure why this situation prevails, they all shrug their shoulders and say, "We don't know, God has willed it thus!"

For example, in determining the permissibility or impermissibility of multimedia messaging, which verse or hadith do the maraji' taqlid rely on that ordinary people cannot understand? Suppose they cannot — can the academic community and the people's representatives in parliament also not understand? Note that we are not judging whether the maraji's ruling is correct or incorrect; let us assume it is correct. The question is: which system and mechanism has given the maraji' this status and position that with a single letter they can direct decisions for the entire society, even if the majority of society are not their muqallids? If this decision-making method is correct, let a law be passed for it; if not, what other than the unquestioning following of a large group of people has brought about this situation? A group whose number is not specified, whose basis for determining those maraji' as the most learned is not known, who do not know when and where God gave their most learned permission to determine practical instances for muqallids, whose basis for the marja' reaching that ruling is not known, who do not know how sound their reasoning is, who do not know how much their letter is effective in the final decision, and who — neither the maraji' nor their muqallids — accept any responsibility for the consequences when people later turn to foreign social media.

Note that what is being described is a natural cause-and-effect relationship between taqlid and a culture of unquestioning obedience in society, and it is not necessarily specific to Iran. If this same tradition were to prevail in any other country, it would naturally bring about this situation. A president and member of parliament on another continent who throughout their life, for their religious affairs, has taken one individual as God's representative and considered whatever he says as God's opinion will, when performing their political duty — which they also consider for God's sake — turn to the marja' taqlid. And the rest of the people, who have generally followed the same path all their lives, will not even think that the marja' was only supposed to help them in determining subsidiary practical rulings and that his expertise was limited to that — yet now he is expressing opinions in all major specialised areas. Why should such people think, study, weigh up options, and give opinions about the destiny of their society? They have already accepted that they are not experts in determining their own otherworldly fate and have no responsibility; what different stance would they take regarding worldly matters? They do not even think to themselves: assuming God has permitted me to follow a scholar without proof in individual rulings, has God permitted me to impose the opinion of someone I consider the most learned upon other people? Is there a mechanism to take into account the number and opinion of those who act on precaution?

When we return to the documents and evidence presented for taqlid, the height of the discrepancy becomes clear. The verses and narrations presented are so weak that they do not even indicate taqlid itself, let alone granting permission for several maraji' to determine the duty of the entire society! Does the verse that says "why does not a group of people engage in tafaqquh to warn (others)" imply that God has said, for example, fifty people should engage in tafaqquh so that three or four of them can give opinions on every social matter, and without any accountability, their opinions are implemented for the whole society? Or does the narration "it is incumbent upon the common people to imitate the jurist" imply that in social affairs, duty should be determined by a few of them, even if a large group of people consider those specific individuals to be followers of their whims and believe them to lack qualifications? Or does the narration "ask Yunus and his son about the teachings of your religion" imply that the Imam said Yunus and his son should take charge of social affairs in a particular region? If someone asked the Imam, "The ruler of the city wants my opinion on a certain matter of city administration," would the Imam still say, "Ask Yunus and his son and tell that to the ruler, and do not worry — if they are wrong, the responsibility is not yours"? If the ruler himself referred to the Imam, would the Imam tell him to consult Yunus and his son on behalf of the people to determine his duty?!^[1]

Parent page: What Harms Does Taqlid Have

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