Modern Idolatry

There is a group of people who see the problem of taqlid merely in the method of deriving rulings and the type of fatwas issued through this method, and believe the way out is to dialogue with and persuade jurists to change their method. In other words, while accepting that they are not experts and must follow the jurist without examination, they simultaneously claim the status of supervising, criticising, and setting policy for the maraji' and seminaries. For example, debates recently took place between Mr. Alidoust and Mr. Soroush, and in the margins and on the pretext of these debates, it was observed in smaller gatherings that advocates of taqlid believed that the current jurists and mujtahids have problems that we should point out to them and try to persuade them to correct their methods (according to our discretion), and then our taqlid of them would be correct. In the author's view, this phenomenon is impossible and a vicious circle, and falling into this abyss will ultimately lead only to the slaughter of logic, science, and truth. The following explains this perspective.

When we delegate our responsibility for determining religious duties to the jurist or religious expert, we effectively remove ourselves from the process of cognition and decision-making. In such circumstances, we cannot later say to that jurist: "In this particular case, I think you are wrong. You had better change your method."

The main issue is: where do we place the source of recognising truth and correctness? If from the outset we have concluded that we ourselves lack the ability to distinguish right from wrong and have delegated this task to another group, we cannot later tell that group that we have now found a better method for discovering truth and expect them to change their method based on what we say, and then we again follow them without asking for proof. Most jurists have been trained from the beginning with the presupposition that people lack the ability to understand the details of rulings. With such a foundational presupposition, how could they possibly accept that people analyse, critique, and prescribe methods and fundamental issues of jurisprudence? In such a structure, even if one of them is a truth-seeker open to criticism, would the majority of jurists tolerate his changes? Experience has shown that jurists with different or innovative approaches have rarely been accepted by the traditional body of jurisprudence.

This issue is not necessarily due to personal bias or arrogance on their part. The problem is that if they accept that people are to be muqallids and at the same time can have opinions on the method of jurisprudence and the process of deriving rulings, the very logical foundation upon which they have built everything collapses. It is like patients who until yesterday did not know what medicine was suitable for them, deciding today to have opinions on the method of research, discovery, and production of medicine and to set its framework. Such a change in role and status calls into question the entire previous system.

If the belief is that humans lack the ability to understand rulings, then we remove the burden and responsibility from our own shoulders and place it upon the jurist, elevating him to a position close to the divine in determining rulings. Then, when after several decades or even centuries we feel that his rulings have problems, we bring him down, make changes, and then put him back in the same position. Is this not similar to the tradition of idol-making and idol-worshipping? Whenever we saw that our idol had become dusty and lost its former charisma and awe, we would bring it down, give it a touch-up, make some changes, and put it back in the place of divinity? Is this not the same artificial system (ṣun') that we ourselves have created to escape responsibility? How can one blindly follow something that we ourselves have designed and directed?

If we search for the word "make" (ṣun') in the Qur'an, we clearly find that God has issued serious warnings about what people "make" or "fabricate," including in the expressions "what they make" (mā yaṣna'ūn) or "you make" (taṣna'ūn). For example:

Then do those who disbelieve think that they can take My servants instead of Me as protectors? Indeed, We have prepared Hell for the disbelievers as a lodging. (18:102) Say, "[Shall We] inform you of the greatest losers as to [their] deeds? (103) [They are] those whose effort is lost in worldly life, while they think they are doing well in work. (104) Those are the ones who disbelieve in the verses of their Lord and in [their] meeting Him, so their deeds have become worthless; and We will not assign to them on the Day of Resurrection any importance. (105) That is their recompense — Hell — for what they denied and [because] they took My signs and My messengers in ridicule. (106)"

To be completed.

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