Introduction

Approaching others and asking them is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental human behaviors. From the beginning of history until now, human beings have always found themselves at crossroads of choice. Incomplete knowledge, limited time and resources, numerous needs and sufferings, and an endless desire for progress and perfection have compelled them to make use of the knowledge, experiences, and achievements of others. There is hardly any aspect of life in which a person can proceed independently without referring to others. In fact, the progress of human civilization is the result of this very reliance on the knowledge of others; if every individual had needed to rediscover everything from scratch, humanity would never have reached this stage of advancement. It is clear that the issue is very fundamental and encompasses the entirety of human life.

But does imitation (taqlid) mean, as it is widely said, "referring to an expert"? In many fields such as medicine, architecture, and automobiles, we refer to specialists and benefit from their knowledge and experience, yet no one ever calls this “imitation,” nor does anyone say, for example, “I imitate my doctor or my car mechanic.” However, in the realm of Shia Islam, not only has referring to an expert been labeled with the derogatory term “imitation”, but contradictory rules and prohibitions have also been formulated around it. For example, for the so called five-pillars of Islam, it is considered forbidden. This raises the question: if imitation means referring to an expert, and if such referral is always and everywhere completely rational, then why is it forbidden in the five-principles of belief? If there are cases where referring to an expert is not rational (and therefore forbidden), why is imitation in the five matters of belief included among those cases, while imitation in practices is not?! If a ruling from God and His messengers has prohibited referring to specialists in the basic principles of faith, then that ruling should be examined to clarify how the ancillaries of faith have been exempted. Who, in fact, and where, divided religion into the two parts of five principles and ten ancillaries?! If there is no direct prohibition from God and His messengers, then what is the flaw in referring to an expert in beliefs that does not exist in doing that for the ancillaries?

These questions and many others like them are the subject of the collection before you, and an effort will be made to address them briefly and in simple language. However, so as not to leave the above questions unanswered even here, the very brief answer is that no, imitation is not exactly the same as referring to an expert. There are important differences that have led to this term being used for it and to its being declared forbidden in the principles of faith, along with many other issues. This has been a frequently repeated fallacy that has led us to think that "imitation is the same as a patient referring to a doctor, but in the religious sphere". For more details on what imitation is, see the next section, namely the definition of imitation.

Before anything else, however, it is necessary to recall a few points. First, when we say that there has been fallacy in the definition of imitation, or that truths have not been stated, or that contradictory rulings have been formulated, or that human dignity has been undermined, and similar statements, our intention is not to claim that the scholars had ill intent. On the contrary, there is no doubt about the purity and sincerity of the majority of them. The fact that all our documents and evidence are quoted from their own books shows that they wrote these materials honestly and without bad intention. However, perhaps under the influence of their great attachment to their teachers, or for other reasons, they overlooked what is explained in this collection, or perhaps justified and embellished it in some way for themselves. In any case, not only do we not attribute ill intent to them, but there is no negative statement about them in this collection except for two points: first, that they are not infallible and may make mistakes—which is true for all people, including the writer of these lines—and second, that their view on imitation is mistaken, which is also the main message of this collection and cannot be avoided unless the entire work is abandoned. Despite this serious disagreement, respect for religious scholars is necessary and essential, and a separate discussion is devoted to explaining why. Here we present the first challenge to the audience: if you can find a sentence in this collection that shows disrespect toward religious scholars, please let us know so it can be corrected.

Another point is that some people think opposition to imitation is due to rejecting the rulings of religious authorities or objecting to some of their rulings, and for that reason they deny imitation entirely from the ground up. It should be emphasized at the outset that, at least regarding the author and this collection, this is not the case. The refusal of imitation is not merely because authorities may make mistakes; rather, even if we assume an authority who is 100% correct, even infallible, or even God Himself (whose rulings contain no error), imitation would still be wrong. The problem is not just with choosing the authority such that, if we were to choose God or the infallibles instead of a fallible authority, the issue would be resolved and we could then follow them blindly. No—the fundamental problem lies in the very act of blind following itself, regardless of who the authority is or how exalted they may be.

Some also think that opponents of imitation have acquired a bit of jurisprudential knowledge and, becoming arrogant about it, delude themselves into thinking they know all legal rulings or can derive them themselves—so to speak, they suffer from an illusion of knowledge. It should be emphasized here that “not knowing” is one of the main foundational assumptions of this collection. The entire discussion is that there is a ruling that we do not know, and finding its answer is not as simple as referring to a book or the web. The question is what actions are good, not good, bad, or worse in seeking that answer, and so on. Anyone who already knows the answers to all issues is outside the intended audience of this text and may refrain from continuing to read.

Although this goes beyond the scope of an introduction, it is worth briefly noting that, in fact, this mechanism of imitation is itself based on two major “illusions of knowledge.” First, that “the imitator, or two just scholars, or a group of experts know who is the most expert,” and second, that “the most expert individual knows all issues, and the imitator does not need to ask anyone else about them.” A fair reader will acknowledge that both of these are nothing more than illusions. Nevertheless, the first will be explained in more detail in the section “Choosing the most expert is impossible,” and the second is addressed throughout the text as appropriate. For now, it suffices to accept that authorities are not infallible, and in a specific issue another authority may have the correct answer. Contrary to these illusions of knowledge, I, as an opponent of imitation, consider the duty of both authority and non-authority in seeking knowledge to be the same, and I believe that continuous search for evidence and avoiding blind following will reduce ignorance and increase knowledge for all three parties involved—the questioner, the respondent, and other listeners.

Others imagine that the subject of imitation itself is a specialized matter beyond their capacity. They expect experts to discuss it and then tell them the result: whether they should imitate or not. They fail to realize that this itself is imitation, and the issue of imitation is not, and cannot be, a matter to be approached through imitation—neither in general nor in detail. If that were the case, then members of ISIS and any other sinful group would also have an excuse, since they too have adopted the conditions of imitation in an imitative way from someone they considered more knowledgeable, and that person, as an expert, explained to them what to do and whom to follow or not follow, and they accepted it without examination or evidence. In addition to this argument, the fair reader will realize, by reading the text so far and continuing onward, that the issue is not complicated. Anyone with sound reasoning, a bit of thought, and perhaps some inquiry can determine the correctness or incorrectness of the claims presented. If any part of the text or the referenced sources remains unclear, it is enough to raise the question via the provided Telegram or email so that it can be explained and, if necessary, the relevant text revised.

It may also appear, upon reading the initial sections of this collection—which deal with the position of imitation in the Qur’an and narrations—that the entire discussion is theoretical, so to speak, and that the answer is obtained by searching through books and grappling with the meanings of words and sentences. But this is not the case. In the later sections, you will see that the rational, practical, and experiential aspects of the issue are also addressed. In fact, for me, this matter has never been purely theoretical. Until about a year ago, whenever I thought about imitation and its problems, it was mostly because of challenges and issues that arose in practice. Only in the past year, after hearing that there is only one narration—an unreliable one—that recommends imitation, did I begin searching books and lectures for clues and documented evidence.

Overall, the present text, as a first edition, is certainly not free of flaws and needs revision and improvement in many respects. For example, in choosing section titles, efforts have been made to use short sentences instead of journalistic headings to convey the message of each section concisely, which some readers may not find appealing. Also, since different sections were written at different times and sometimes in response to scattered conversational discussions, the tone may vary between sections; over time, efforts will be made to unify them.

With the above in mind, the first chapter defines the concept of imitation and attempts to examine and resolve differences in its definition that cause confusion and hinder a shared understanding in the discussion. The second chapter examines the place of imitation in the primary sources of Shi‘ism, namely the Qur’an and hadiths.
The third chapter critiques the rational arguments presented in support of imitation and attempts to demonstrate their invalidity. After that, the fourth chapter discusses suitable alternatives to imitation and offers suggestions for alternative paths.
The fifth chapter examines imitation from a phenomenological perspective and analyzes the problems this phenomenon has created in practice. Finally, the sixth chapter, by raising some related topics, is devoted to the final conclusion.

Important points at a glance
In this section, a summary of the topics and chapters is provided so that you can gain a clear picture of the book’s content. You may follow each section in any order you prefer. Efforts have been made to keep each section as independent as possible and to include links to related topics so you can more easily find the content you are interested in.

Imitation means blind following. Definition of imitation

Instead of imitation, everyone should engage in understanding (tafaqquh) to their own extent, and this includes referring to experts. If we do not imitate, what should we do?

While the issue of ijtihad and imitation is fundamental to religion, there is no recommendation of imitation in the Qur’an. On the contrary, the Qur’an strongly and repeatedly condemns imitation.

The hadiths cited in support of imitation either lack authenticity or do not indicate it. We do not have a روایت supporting imitation; instead, we have hadiths that explicitly or implicitly forbid imitation. Imitation is negated in narrations.

The Qur’an recommends understanding (tafaqquh) to all people; its verses praise reflection and thought, and many hadiths also consider understanding a duty for everyone. The instruction of the Infallibles to pursue understanding universally.

From a rational perspective, imitation has many problems:

Religion differs from other specialized sciences
Not every referral to a specialist is rational
Religion cannot be divided into fundamentals and derivations
Choosing the most learned is impossible
Responsibility for actions is not transferred to the authority (verses denying transfer of responsibility)
God’s religion is not difficult
What harms does imitation have?
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